Abstract. We prove a security theorem without collision-resistance for a class of 1-key hash-function-based MAC schemes that includes HMAC and Envelope MAC. The proof has some advantages over earlier proofs: it is in the uniform model, it uses a weaker related-key assumption, and it covers a broad class of MACs in a single theorem. However, we also explain why our theorem is of doubtful value in assessing the real-world security of these MAC schemes. In addition, we prove a theorem assuming collision-resistance. From these two theorems we conclude that from a provable security standpoint there is little reason to prefer HMAC to Envelope MAC or similar schemes.
Introduction
A common method of constructing a message authentication code (MAC) is the "nested" construction (NMAC). One first applies a keyed iterated hash function h(K 1 , M ) (constructed from a compression function f ) to the message M , and then one puts this hash value into a second keyed functionf (K 2 , h(K 1 , M )) (wheref is also a compression function). For efficiency and ease of implementation one usually wants the MAC to depend on a single key K, and so one sets K 1 = K 2 = K or, more generally, K 1 = g 1 (K), K 2 = g 2 (K) for some functions g 1 , g 2 . Our main purpose is to prove a new security theorem without collision-resistance that covers arbitrary constructions of this type. The theorem says, roughly speaking, that the MAC is a pseudorandom function (prf) provided that bothf and f are pseudorandom functions and the functions f,f , g 1 , g 2 satisfy a certain rather weak related-key assumption. This theorem is a generalized 1-key version of our Theorem 10.1 in [14] .
The two most important examples of this type of MAC are the "Hash-based Message Authenication Code" (HMAC) [2] (standardized in [3] and [16] ) and Envelope MAC (also called "Sandwich MAC," see [23] for a recent version). In these cases there are earlier security proofs without collision resistance in [1] and [23] , but unfortunately those proofs are not valid in the uniform model of complexity. 1 In other words, they use unconstructible adversaries and so have to assume that the cryptographic primitives withstand attack even by unconstructible adversaries. For this reason, as we explained in [14] (see also [5] ), they do not give useful concrete bounds on the resources a prfadversary would need in order to defeat the MAC. In contrast, our theorem is proved in the uniform model; this means that it needs much milder assumptions.
Date: May 1, 2013. 1 Fischlin [6] has a uniform proof of a security theorem for HMAC without collision-resistance, but its usefulness is questionable because of the extremely large tightness gap in his result.
One of the five finalists in the NIST SHA-3 competition used Envelope MAC. The designers of the "Grøstl" construction wrote ( §6.1 of [7] ) : We propose this envelope construction as a dedicated MAC mode using Grøstl. This construction has been proved to be a secure MAC under similar assumptions as HMAC. Here the designers were referring to the proof in [23] , but they were apparently unaware that Yasuda's proof is not valid in the uniform model and for that reason gives much weaker guarantees than one would expect. As we commented in [15] , one of the drawbacks of results obtained in the non-uniform model is the possibility that they will be used by other authors who are unaware of the extremely limited nature of such results from a practice-oriented standpoint. In any case, in the present paper we remove this gap in the security argument in [7] by supplying a uniform proof.
There is a second respect in which our theorem makes a milder assumption than earlier theorems of this type: our related-key assumption is weaker than the one defined in [1, 4] . This not only gives us a stronger theorem, but also enables us to unify HMAC and Envelope MAC in a single theory.
Despite these advantages over earlier security theorems, the sad fact is that our main theorem by itself provides very little assurance about the real-world security of these MAC schemes. In §4 we recall some of the reasons for this.
In §5 we prove a second theorem, this time assuming collision-resistance, that carries over the main result of [2] to 1-key nested MACs. Our two theorems together show that from the standpoint of security reductions there is little difference between HMAC, Envelope MAC, and other similar constructions. We conclude that security theorems are not of much use in deciding which of the competing schemes -HMAC, Envelope MAC, or some other variant -has better security in practice.
Statement of the Main Theorem
Let f : {0, 1} c × {0, 1} b −→ {0, 1} c andf : {0, 1} c × {0, 1} c −→ {0, 1} c be two compression functions. Here b ≥ 2c (typically b = 512 and c = 128 or 160), so that f compresses by a factor of at least 3, whereasf compresses by a factor of 2. Let g i : {0, 1} c −→ {0, 1} c , i = 1, 2. We suppose that all of these functions are publicly and efficiently computable.
By a (t, q)-adversary we mean an adversary that makes ≤ueries and has running time ≤ t. Recall that f is said to be an (ǫ, t, q)-secure pseudorandom function (prf) if no (t, q)-adversary can distinguish between f with a hidden key and a random function with advantage ≥ ǫ. We say that f is strongly (ǫ, t, q)-secure (see [14] ) if such an adversary is permitted to "reset" the oracle before each query, by which we mean that in response to the adversary's request the oracle chooses either a new random key (if it is f (K, .)) or a new random function (if it is a random function r ′ (.)).
We now define the "related-key assumption" that we shall use in our main theorem.
Definition 1.
In the above setting, we say that (f,f ) is (ǫ, t, q)-secure against (g 1 , g 2 )-related-key attacks if no (t, q)-adversary has an advantage greater than or equal to ǫ in the following interaction with the oracle O rka . First, the oracle chooses a random bit; if it is 0, the oracle chooses two random keys K 1 , K 2 ∈ {0, 1} c ; if it is 1, the oracle chooses one random key K ∈ {0, 1} c and sets
Each query of the adversary is a message M in either {0, 1} b or {0, 1} c , to which the oracle responds with either f (K 1 , M ) orf (K 2 , M ), respectively. At the end the adversary guesses the oracle's random bit.
We recall that in this situation the advantage of the adversary is defined as Prob(adversary guesses 1 oracle chose 1)− Prob(adversary guesses 1 oracle chose 0), where Prob(A B) denotes the conditional probability of event A given event B. This setting is general enough to include two of the best-known MAC constructions (see Figure 1 ):
(1) For HMAC, let IV be a fixed (and publicly known) initiation vector, and let ipad and opad be two fixed elements of {0, 1} b (also publicly known). We let a superscript 0 on a bitstring in {0, 1} c indicate that we are appending b − c zero bits to it. We setf (K,
For Envelope MAC, let IV be a fixed (and publicly known) initiation vector; let
Remark 1. The above related-key assumption is weaker than the related-key assumption in [1, 4] . In that assumption the oracle is required to simply give the adversary the two keys K 1 , K 2 . In that case the adversary can of course compute any number of desired values f (K 1 , M ) orf (K 2 , M ), limited only by the running time bound; in other words, the rka-adversary in our assumption is less powerful (because it has less information) than the rka-adversary in [1, 4] . Moreover, with the rka-assumption in [1, 4] we wouldn't have been able to include Envelope MAC in our theorem, because when g 2 (K) = K the adversary, if given K 1 and K 2 , can trivially determine whether or not
In the above setting let h : {0, 1} c × {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} c denote the iterated hash function that, given a key K ∈ {0, 1} c and a
. . , m − 1 and sets h(K, M ) = h m . We define the message authentication code MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 as follows:
Notice that when g 1 (K) = f (IV, K 0 ⊕ ipad) and g 2 (K) = f (IV, K 0 ⊕ opad) this definition agrees with that of HMAC; and when g 1 (K) = f (IV, K 0 ) and g 2 (K) = K it agrees with that of Envelope MAC (see Figure 1) .
By a (t, q, n)-adversary we mean an adversary that makes ≤ueries of blocklength ≤ n and has running time ≤ t. We say that MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 is an (ǫ, t, q, n)-secure pseudorandom function if no (t, q, n)-adversary can distinguish between MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 with hidden key and a random function with advantage ≥ ǫ. Theorem 1. Suppose that f is a strongly (ǫ 1 , t, q)-secure pseudorandom function,f is an (ǫ 2 , t, q)-secure pseudorandom function, and Remark 2. In the statement of the theorem the expression 2n(ǫ 1 + q 2 2 −c ) + ǫ 2 + 2ǫ 3 can be replaced by 2nǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + 2ǫ 3 . The reason is that, as explained in Remark 10.2 of [14] , the generic key-guessing attack on the strong pseudorandomness property has advantage roughly (qt/T )2 −c ; since we need t > qnT for the theorem to have content, it follows that ǫ 1 ≫ q 2 2 −c . Before proving Theorem 1, we give an informal summary of the argument. The first step is to show that a prf-adversary A MAC of MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 is also a prf-adversary -with almost the same advantage -of the MAC obtained by replacing the (g 1 , g 2 )-related keys by independent random keys. Here "almost" means that we can construct a related-key-attack A rka on (f,f ) whose advantage is equal to half the difference between the advantage of A MAC when the keys are (g 1 (K), g 2 (K)) and its advantage when the keys are independent. This step reduces the problem to the case when there are two independent keys, at which point we can essentially follow the proof for NMAC in [14] . Namely, we show that a prf-adversary for the MAC succeeds only when either the prf-property of the outer shellf (K 2 , .) is attacked (we call its adversary Af ) or else a collision is produced in the iterated hash-function that's inside this shell. In the latter case we use the collision to construct a prf-adversary of f . Since there are two possible types of collisions that can occur and up to n iterations of the hash function, this leads to roughly 2n f -adversaries. This intuitively explains why 2nǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + 2ǫ 3 appears in the conclusion of the theorem. The term 2n q 2 2 −c arises because of the possibility of random collisions between c-bit strings.
We shall give the actual proof in the next section. The above plausibility argument shows that the basic ideas in the proof are simple. However, the organization is a little intricate because of the need to proceed carefully with the reduction using all of the adversaries. We see no way to come up with a more concise self-contained proof, and we apologize to the reader for that.
Proof of the Main Theorem
Proof. We will prove the following equivalent statement: if f is a strongly (( ǫ−ǫ 2 −2ǫ 3 2n − q 2 2 −c ), t + (qnT + Cq log q), q)-secure pseudorandom function,f is an (ǫ 2 , t + (qnT + Cq log q), q)-secure pseudorandom function, and (f,f ) is (ǫ 3 , t + (qnT + Cq log q), 2q)-secure against (g 1 , g 2 )-related-key attacks, then MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 is an (ǫ, t, q, n)-secure pseudorandom function. The proof starts by supposing that we have a (t, q, n)-adversary A MAC that has advantage ≥ ǫ in the pseudorandomness test for MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 , and then it proceeds to construct a (t + (qnT + Cq log q), 2q)-adversary A rka of the related-key property, a (t + (qnT + Cq log q), q)-adversary Af of the pseudorandom property off , and a (t + (qnT + Cq log q), q)-adversary A f of the pseudorandom property of f such that at least one of the following holds:
(i) A rka has advantage ≥ ǫ 3 against the (g 1 , g 2 )-related key property of (f,f ).
(ii) Af has advantage ≥ ǫ 2 in the pseudorandomness test forf .
Note that if any of these three conditions holds, we have a contradiction that proves the theorem.
For the i-th message query M i we use the notation M i ℓ to denote its ℓ-th block,
be the truncation after the m-th block, and we set
is the message with the first m − 1 blocks deleted. We say that a message is "non-empty" if its block length is at least 1.
Let h be the corresponding iterated function, and letf h be the MAC that for a key
Let r(M ) denote a random function of messages, and let r ′ (M 1 ) denote a random function of 1-block messages. In response to an input of suitable length, r ′ or r outputs a random c-bit string, subject only to the condition that if the same input is given a second time (in the same run of the algorithm) the output will be the same. In the test for pseudorandomness the oracle is either a random function or the function being tested, as determined by a random bit (coin toss). Now suppose that we have a (t, q, n)-adversary A MAC that, interacting with its oracle O MAC , has advantage ≥ ǫ against the prf-test for MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 . We use A MAC to construct four adversaries Af h , A rka , Af , and A f . The last three are the adversaries in the above conditions (i)-(iii); the (t + (qnT + Cq log q), q, n)-adversary Af h attacks the pseudorandomness property off h. Each adversary makes at most the same number of queries as A MAC (except that the related-key adversary can make up to 2q queries) and has a comparable running time. More precisely, the bound t + (qnT + Cq log q) on the running time of an adversary comes from the time required to run A MAC , make at most q computations of h-values, and store at most q values (coming from oracle responses and h-computations) in lexicographical order and sort them looking for collisions. (An adversary does not in all cases perform all of these steps; rather, this is an upper bound.)
The related-key adversary A rka runs A MAC and interacts with the related-key oracle O rka , which chooses a random bit u. Recall that A rka , after querying the oracle O rka with at most 2q b-bit or c-bit messages, must guess whether the keys K 1 and K 2 that O rka is using are independent (i.e., u = 0) or are related by K i = g i (K), i = 1, 2, for some K (i.e., u = 1).
The adversary A rka randomly chooses a bit ℓ, and as A MAC runs, A rka responds to each query M i as follows. If ℓ = 0, its response to each query is a random c-bit string (except in the case when a query is repeated, in which case the response is also repeated). If ℓ = 1, then it first queries O rka with M i 1 and computes
.) Now A rka makes a second query to O rka -this time the c-bit query H -and responds to A MAC 's query with O rka (H).
2 At the end A rka guesses that the random bit u chosen by O rka is 1 if A MAC guesses that the random bit ℓ chosen by A rka (which is simulating an oracle) is 1; otherwise, it guesses that u = 0. (Note that A rka guesses 0 if A MAC stops or reaches time t without producing a guess; this could happen if A rka is not properly simulating O MAC , which would imply that u = 0.) Let δ denote the advantage of A rka .
We also construct an adversary Af h that interacts with its oracle Of h and runs A MAC . When A MAC makes a query M i , the adversary Af h queries Of h and sends A MAC the response Of h (M i ). If A MAC guesses that the oracle simulated by Af h is a random function, then Af h guesses that its oracle Of h is a random function; otherwise Af h guesses that its oracle isf h with hidden keys. In particular, note that if A MAC stops or fails to produce a guess in time t -as may happen when Af h is not property simulating Returning to the description of A rka , we see that there are two cases, depending on whether the random bit u of the oracle O rka was (a) 1 (that is, its keys are related) or (b) 0 (that is, its keys are independent). In case (a) the interaction of A rka with A MAC precisely simulates O MAC , and in case (b) it precisely simulates Of h . (As we noted, in case (b) our original adversary A MAC may stop or run for time t without producing a guess; in this case A rka makes the guess 0.) Let p 1 = Prob(A MAC guesses 1 ℓ = 1 and u = 1); p 2 = Prob(A MAC guesses 1 ℓ = 1 and u = 0);
Note that when ℓ = 0 there is no interaction with O rka , and so the guess that A MAC makes is independent of whether u = 0 or u = 1.
By assumption, A MAC has advantage ≥ ǫ in a prf-test for MAC f,f ,g 1 ,g 2 ; in other words, 
If condition (ii) in the first paragraph of the proof does not hold, then δ < ǫ 3 , in which case γ > ǫ − 2ǫ 3 . For the remainder of the proof we assume that the advantage of Af h satsifies this inequality, since otherwise (ii) holds and we're done. The rest of the proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 10.1 of [14] . We shall give the details rather than simply citing [14] because the present setting is slightly more general (with two pseudorandom compression functions f andf rather than just one) and because there is some benefit in having a self-contained proof in one place.
We now construct anf -adversary Af and consider its advantage. As before, for any oracle O we let O(M ) denote the response of O to the query M . The adversary Af is given an oracle Of and, using Af h as a subroutine, has to decide whether Of isf (K 2 , .) or a random function r ′ (.) of 1-block messages. She chooses a random K 1 and presents the adversary Af h with an oracle that is eitherf (K 2 , h(K 1 , .)) or else a random function r(.); that is, she simulates Of h (see below). In time ≤ t with ≤ueries Af h is able with advantage γ > ǫ − 2ǫ 3 to guess whether Of h isf h with hidden keys or a random function r. Here is how Af simulates Of h : in response to a query M i from Af h , she computes h(K 1 , M i ), which she queries to Of , and then gives Af h the value Of (h(K 1 , M i )). Eventually (unless the simulation is imperfect, see below) Af h states whether it believes that its oracle Of h isf h or r, at which point Af states the same thing for the oracle Of -that is, if Af h saidf h, then she says that Of must have beenf , whereas if Af h said that Of h is r, then she says that Of is r ′ . Notice that if the oracle Of isf (K 2 , .), then the oracle Of h that Af simulates for Af h isf h (with random key K = (K 1 , K 2 )); if the oracle Of is r ′ (.), then the oracle that Af simulates for Af h acts as r with the important difference that if h(K 1 , M i ) coincides with an earlier h(K 1 , M j ) the oracle outputs the same value (even though M i = M j ) rather than a second random value.
3 If the latter happens with negligible probability, then this algorithm Af is as successful in distinguishingf from a random function as Af h is 3 If Af h fails to produce a guess about the oracle Of h in time t, as can happen if the simulation is imperfect, then Af guesses that Of is a random function. Note that the simulation is perfect if Of is f with hidden key.
in distinguishingf h from a random function. Otherwise, two sequences of f -adversaries A (m) f and B (m) f come into the picture, as described below. The general idea of these adversaries is that they each use the oracle O f in the pseudorandomness test for f to look for collisions between h-values of two different messages M i , M j queried by A f h . More precisely, the m-th adversary in a sequence works not with all of a queried message, but rather with the message with its first m − 1 blocks deleted. If a collision is produced, then with a certain probability O f must be f (K 2 , .); however, one must also account for the possibility that O f is r ′ (.), and in the case of A . First we make a remark about probabilities, which are taken over all possible coin tosses of the adversary, all possible keys, the oracle's "choice bit" (which determines whether it is the function being tested or a random function), and the coin tosses of the oracle in the case when it outputs a random function. 4 If the adversary's oracle is f or f h with hidden keys, then the adversary's queries in general depend on the keys (upon which the oracle's responses depend) as well as the adversary's coin tosses. However, if the adversary's oracle is a random function -which is the situation when A f fails and the sequences of adversaries A are needed -then the oracle responses can be regarded simply as additional coin tosses, and the adversary's queries then depend only on the coin tosses and are independent of the keys. This is an important observation for understanding the success probabilities of the adversaries.
We define α 0 to be the probability, taken over all coin tosses of Af h (including those coming from random oracle responses) and all keys K 1 , that the sequence of Af h -queries M i satisfies the following property:
there exist i and j, j < i, such that h(
For m ≥ 1 we define α m to be the probability, taken over all coin tosses of Af h and all q-tuples of keys (K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K q ), that the sequence of Af h -queries M i satisfies the following property:
(1 m ) there exist i and j, j < i, such that
where for any index i for which M i,(m+1) = ∅ we let ℓ i denote the smallest index for which
Finally, for m ≥ 1 we define β m to be the probability, taken over all coin tosses of Af h and all q-tuples of keys (K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K q ), that the sequence of Af h -queries M i satisfies the following property:
We now return to the situation where with non-negligible probability α 0 the queries made by Af h lead to at least one collision h(K 1 , M i ) = h(K 1 , M j ). Note that the 4 The term "over all possible coin tosses" means over all possible runs of the algorithm with each weighted by 2 −s , where s is the number of random bits in a given run.
advantage of the adversary Af is at least ǫ − 2ǫ 3 − α 0 . If condition (ii) fails, i.e., if this advantage is < ǫ 2 , it follows that α 0 > ǫ − ǫ 2 − 2ǫ 3 . In the remainder of the proof, we shall assume that this is the case, since otherwise (i) holds and we're done. The first adversary in the sequence A
It is, of course, conceivable that even when
In other words, we have (1 1 ). Recall that the probability that this occurs is α 1 .
It is also possible that even when O f is r ′ (.) there is a collision involving one or both of the random values L i or L j that is produced when M i, (2) or M j,(2) is empty. If both are empty, then the probability that can query. Like A ′ f , he runs Af h once and gives random responses to its queries. As Af h makes queries, he sorts their prefixes (where we are using the word "prefix" to denote the first m − 1 blocks of a query that has block-length at least m). If the i-th query has block-length at least m and if its prefix coincides with that of an earlier query, he records the index ℓ i of the first query that has the same prefix; if it has a different prefix from earlier queries he sets ℓ i = i. After running Af h , he goes back to the first query M j 1 that has block-length at least m and for all i for which ℓ i = j 1 (that is, for all queries that have the same prefix as M j 1 ) he queries M i m to O f and computes
is non-empty and otherwise takes y i = O f (M i m ). Then he resets O f and goes to the first j 2 such that M j 2 has block-length at least m and a different prefix from M j 1 . For all i for which ℓ i = j 2 he queries M i m to O f and computes
is non-empty and otherwise takes y i = O f (M i m ). He continues in this way until he's gone through all the queries. He then looks for two indices j < i such that y j = y i . If he finds a collision, he guesses that O f is f with hidden key; otherwise, he guesses that it is a random function.
The adversary A (m) f takes advantage of the α m−1 probability of a collision of the form (1 m−1 ), and if such a collision occurs he guesses that O f is f with hidden key. The possibility that O f is really r ′ (.) is due to two conceivable circumstances -a collision of the form (1 m ) or a collision among random values (either a collision between two random values L i and L j or between L i and h(L j , M j,(m+1) ), or else a collision of the form (2 m ) with K i = L i -here the probability of such a collision is bounded by q 2 2 −c and by β m , respectively).
Finally, the sequence of adversaries B
f , m ≥ 1, is defined as follows. As usual, O f denotes the prf-test oracle for f that B (m) f can query. She runs Af h once and gives random responses to its queries. As Af h makes queries, she sorts their prefixes (where this time we are using the word "prefix" to denote the first m blocks of a query that has block-length at least m). She makes up a list of pairs (i, S(i)), where the i-th query has block-length exactly m and coincides with the prefix of at least one other query; in that case S(i) denotes the set of indices j = i such that M j,[m] = M i . After running Af h , she chooses a message-block Y that is different from all the blocks M j m+1 of all queries M j . She goes through all indices i with non-empty S(i). For each such i she queries Y to O f and for each j ∈ S(i) she also queries M j m+1 to O f and computes
. She looks for a collision between O f (Y ) and y j for j ∈ S(i). Before going to the next i she resets O f . If she finds a collision for any of the i, she guesses that O f is f with hidden key; otherwise, she guesses that it is a random function. The advantage of this adversary is at least
, whereas if O f is a random function, then O f (Y ) has probability only 2 −c of coinciding with this h-value.
We thus have the following lower bounds for the advantages of the adversaries:
Trivially we have α n = β n = 0, and so the adversaries go no farther than A . The sum of all the advantages of the 2n − 1 adversaries telescopes and is at least α 0 − (2n − 1)
Since we have no way of knowing which of these adversaries has the greatest advantage, we make a random selection. That is, the adversary A f we use to attack the pseudorandomness of f consists of randomly choosing one of the 2n
(1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1) and running it. The advantage of the adversary A f is the expectation obtained by summing the advantages of the 2n−1 adversaries with each one weighted by the probability 1/(2n − 1) that we choose the corresponding adversary. This advantage is at least
). Thus, returning to the first paragraph of the proof, we have shown that if conditions (i) and (ii) do not hold, then condition (iii) holds.
Interpretation
How useful is our theorem as a guarantee of real-world security? As in the case of Theorem 10.1 of [14] , there are several reasons for skepticism concerning the practical assurance provided by Theorem 1:
(1) In order to conclude that our MAC is an (ǫ, t, q, n)-secure pseudorandom function, we need the inner compression function f to be a strongly (ǫ/(2n), t, q)-secure pseudorandom function. In other words, we have a tightness gap of about 2n, which is large if, for example, we allow a block-length bound of 2 20 or 2 30 .
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(2) Theorem 1 is in the single-user setting, and its security assurances could fail in the more realistic multi-user setting. (3) The three hypotheses in Theorem 1 -pseudorandomness of the outer compression function, strong pseudorandomness of the inner compression function 6 and the related-key property -are in general extremely difficult to evaluate. When the assumptions in a theorem cannot be evaluated in any convincing manner, we should not be surprised if practitioners view the theorem as having little value.
Security Theorem with Collision-Resistance
There are two types of security theorems that have been proved about nested MACs. Starting with Bellare's paper [1] (see also [6, 14, 19] ), some authors have proved theorems without assuming collision-resistance of the iterated hash function. The idea is that confidence in security of a MAC scheme should not depend upon the rather strong assumption that an adversary cannot find hash collisions. Our Theorem 1 continues this line of work.
On the other hand, if one is using a hash function that one strongly believes to be collision-resistant and one wants to know that an adversary cannot forge message tags, then one can go back to the much earlier and more easily proved security theorem in [2] . The purpose of this section is to carry over the main result of [2] to our class of 1-key nested MACs.
An iterated hash function h is said to be (ǫ, t, q, n)-weakly-collision-resistant if no (t, q, n)-adversary that queries h(K, .) has success probability ≥ ǫ of producing a collision h(K, M ′ ) = h(K, M ). (Here h(K, .) is regarded as an oracle, i.e., a black box, and K is a hidden key.) A MAC is said to be (ǫ, t, q, n)-secure against forgery if no (t, q, n)-adversary has success probability ≥ ǫ of producing a tag for an unqueried message of block-length ≤ n. 5 The tightness gap in our theorem, bad as it is, is not nearly as extreme as the one in Fischlin's theorem [6] , which establishes the secure-MAC property for NMAC and HMAC based on assumptions that are slightly weaker than the prf property. The tightness gap in that theorem is roughly qn 2 . In [6] it is claimed that at least this is better than the tightness gap in Bellare's Theorem 3.3 in [1] , which is q 2 n. However, that claim is misleading, since the factor q 2 n in Bellare's theorem is multiplied by the advantage of a very low-resource adversary A2 with running time ≤ nT , much less than that of Fischlin's adversary. One must always include running time comparisons when evaluating tightness gaps, and this is not done in [6] . 6 Note that the inner compression function needs to be strongly (ǫ1, t, q)-secure for a quite small value of ǫ1, since the theorem loses content if ǫ1 > 1/(2n). Theorem 2. Suppose that the iterated hash function h coming from the compression function f is (ǫ 1 , t, q, n)-weakly-collision-resistant, the compression functionf is an (ǫ 2 , t, q, 1)-secure MAC, and (f,f ) is (ǫ 3 , t, 2q + 2)-secure against (g 1 , g 2 )-related key attacks. Then MACf ,f,g 1 ,g 2 is an (ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 , t − (q + 1)nT, q, n)-secure MAC, where T is the time required for one evaluation of f orf .
Proof. The proof is quite simple. Suppose that we are given a (t − (q + 1)nT, q, n)-adversary A MAC that has probability ≥ ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 of forging a MACf ,f,g 1 ,g 2 -tag. Then we construct three adversaries -a (t, q)-adversary Af , a (t, q, n)-adversary A wcr and a (t, 2q + 2)-adversary A rka -such that at least one of the following is true:
(i) Af has probability ≥ ǫ 2 of forging af -tag.
(ii) A wcr has probability ≥ ǫ 1 of producing an h-collision.
(iii) A rka has advantage ≥ ǫ 3 against the (g 1 , g 2 )-related key property of (f,f ). (It does not matter which of (i), (ii), (iii) is true, since any one of the three would contradict the assumptions of the theorem.)
We first use A MAC to construct both an adversary A rka of the related-key property and an adversary Af h that can forge anf h-tag. (Recall thatf h denotes the MAC M ) ) with independent keys.) The adversary A rka runs A MAC and interacts with the oracle O rka , which chooses a random bit u. After querying the oracle O rka with at most 2q + 2 b-bit or c-bit messages, A rka must guess whether O rka is using random keys (i.e., u = 0) or related keys (i.e., u = 1). As A MAC runs, for each of its queries M i the adversary A rka queries the first block
), and finally queries H to O rka ; it gives the value O rka (H) to A MAC as the tag of the queried message. If in time ≤ t − (q + 1)nT the adversary A MAC forges a tag of an unqueried message, 7 then A rka guesses that u = 1; otherwise, it guesses that u = 0. Let α denote the advantage of A rka , where, by definition
The time A rka needs to perform these steps -that is, computing the values H, waiting for A MAC , and verifying the forgery produced by A MAC -is bounded by qnT + (t − (q + 1)nT ) + nT = t.
We construct Af h as follows. It has anf h-oracle Of h that has hidden keys K 1 , K 2 . The adversary Af h runs A MAC , responding to each of its queries M i by querying Of h and giving A MAC the response Of h (M i ). If A MAC forges thef h-tag of an unqueried message M (which Af h can verify with one further query to its oracle), then Af h has succeeded in forging thef h-tag of M . Let β denote the success probability of this adversary Af h .
Note that the interaction of Af h with A MAC is exactly the same as that of A rka with A MAC in the case u = 0. Thus, the second term on the right in the expression (1) for α is equal to β, whereas the first term is the success probability of A MAC , which by 7 Note that A rka can verify that AMAC has a valid forgery using the same procedure that was used to respond to its queries. This means that A rka needs to be allowed two more queries of O rka , and for this reason the query bound for A rka is 2q + 2 rather than 2q and the time bounds have the term (q + 1)nT rather than qnT . assumption is at least ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 . We hence have α + β ≥ ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 , and this means that either α ≥ ǫ 3 (which is the alternative (iii) above) or else β ≥ ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 .
We now use Af h to construct anf -tag-forging adversary Af and an h-collision-finding adversary A wcr . The former is constructed as follows. After choosing a random key K 1 , Af runs Af h . In response to each query M i from Af h , Af computes H = h(K 1 , M i ), queries this H-value to its oracle Of =f (K 2 , .), and gives the valuef (K 2 , H) to Af h . With probability β in time ≤ t − (q + 1)nT the adversary Af h finds a tag T =f h( M ), where M is different from all of the queried messages. The bound on the time Af needs to perform these steps -that is, computing the values h(K 1 , M i ) and waiting for Af his qnT + (t − (q + 1)nT ) = t − nT . Then Af takes time ≤ nT to compute H = h(K 1 , M ), hoping that it is different from all H-values that were queried to Of , it which case it has succeeded in forging anf -tag. Meanwhile, the adversary A wcr , who has an oracle O wcr that responds to queries with h(K 1 , .) where K 1 is a hidden key, is constructed as follows. It chooses a random key K 2 and runs Af h , responding to its queries M i
, where ( M , T ) is the forgery produced by Af h in the event that the latter adversary succeeds in its task. Note that the success probability β of Af h is the sum of the success probability of Af and that of A wcr . Since β ≥ ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 if alternative (iii) does not hold, it follows that at least one of the above alternatives (i)-(iii) must hold.
This concludes the proof.
This theorem, like Theorem 1, provides only a very limited type of security assurance. Two of the three "reasons for skepticism" listed in §4.2 also apply to Theorem 2: it assumes the (unrealistic) single-user setting, and one of its hypotheses -the secure-MAC property for the compression function -is very difficult to evaluate in practice. On the positive side, at least Theorem 2 is tight, unlike Theorem 1. It's reasonable to regard Theorem 2 as providing a type of assurance that the "domain-extender" feature of the MAC scheme is not likely to be a source of security breaches, provided that h is weakly collision-resistant.
The proof of Theorem 2 is short, straightforward, and in some sense tautological. Some people would even say that it is "trivial," although we would prefer not to use such a pejorative word in connection with the proof of Theorem 2. But in any case, it seems to us that proofs of this sort merely confirm what is more or less intuitively obvious from the beginning. Such proofs cannot serve as a meaningful source of confidence in a protocol, and they certainly cannot be a substitute for extensive testing and concrete cryptanalysis.
HMAC vs. Envelope MAC comparison
As discussed in [10] , it often happens that a type of cryptography enjoys nearly universal acceptance more for reasons of historical happenstance than because of its intrinsic advantages over the alternatives. At present HMAC is widely deployed, whereas Envelope MAC languishes in relative obscurity. But the reasons for this seem to lie in the peculiarities of the history of Envelope MAC, and one can argue that, despite this history, it deserves serious consideration as a secure and practical MAC scheme.
An envelope MAC scheme was first presented by Tsudik in [22] . His scheme used two independent c-bit keys, and he argued informally that this would give it 2c bits of security. However, Preneel and van Oorschot [20] showed that the keys can be recovered in 2 c+1 steps if one knows approximately 2 c/2 message-tag pairs. That is, Tsudik was wrong, and two independent keys do not give significantly more security than one key.
Soon after, Kaliski and Robshaw [8] and Piermont and Simpson [18] presented a 1-key variant of Envelope MAC, but it had a flaw. To explain this, for concreteness we'll use MD5 as the underlying hash function with c = 128, b = 512. Let p denote a 384-bit padding, used to extend a key to fill a 512-bit block. Given a 128-bit key K and a message M of arbitrary length, the tag is h(K p M K). Note that the second K may spill over into two blocks since the bitlength of M is not required to be a multiple of b. Preneel and van Oorschot [21] exploited this overlap to design a key-recovery attack that needs approximately 2 64 message-tag pairs and has running time 2 64 . Because a MAC based on MD5 would be expected to require exhaustive search -that is, roughly 2 128 steps -for key recovery, this attack exposed a serious defect in the variant of Envelope MAC in [8, 18] . The Preneel-van Oorschot attack gave Envelope MAC a bad name. However, the attack was possible only because of poor formatting of the second key block.
This flaw can be removed simply by ensuring that each key lies in its own block. This was done by Yasuda [23] . Yasuda also gave a security proof, along the lines of Bellare's HMAC security proof in [1] ; in fact, he made crucial use of Bellare's Lemma 3.1. Like Bellare's proof, Yasuda's security theorem requires unconstructible adversaries and so is not valid in the uniform model of complexity. Our Theorem 1 gives a uniform proof for the version of 1-key Envelope MAC described by Yasuda. As pointed out in [23] , Envelope MAC has a minor efficiency advantage over HMAC because the iterated hash function needs to be applied just once. Generally, the accepted procedure when applying an iterated hash function is to append a block at the end of the message that gives the block-length of the message. (With this modification one can give a simple proof that collision-resistance of f implies collision-resistance of h.) In Envelope MAC this is done just once, whereas in HMAC it needs to be done twice. Envelope MAC also has the advantage of simplicity -no need for ipad and opad.
In order to argue that HMAC is preferable, one thus has to make a persuasive case that it has better security. Our two theorems give the same security results in both cases, and the same building block (a compression function f ) can be used in both. From this standpoint the only grounds for preferring HMAC would be if one of the following holds:
(1) The prf-assumption onf in Theorem 1 is more credible for HMAC than for Envelope MAC. In the former case the assumption is weaker than the prf-assumption on f and in fact follows from it. In the latter case the assumption also seems to be weaker than the prf-assumption on f in practice but not in the formal sense; in Envelope MAC the prf-assumption onf is an additional condition that is not a consequence of the prf-assumption on f . 8 One could claim that the need for a separatef -condition in Envelope MAC means that it is less secure than HMAC.
(2) The secure-MAC assumption onf in Theorem 2 is more credible for HMAC than for Envelope MAC. One would be claiming that it's harder to forge a tag if the key occurs in the first c bits than if it occurs in the next c bits. (3) The different choices of the pair of functions g 1 , g 2 lead to a real difference in strength of the related-key assumptions. There would be a strong reason to prefer HMAC if one could argue that the choice g 2 (K) = K in Envelope MAC makes the related-key (3) assumption less plausible. However, we know of no evidence for any of the above three claims. To the best of our knowledge, no provable security theorem justifies preferring one of these two MACs over the other. Nor does any such theorem preclude the possibility that one would want to choose some other MAC with entirely different functionsf , g 1 , g 2 .
Remark 3. Both HMAC and Envelope MAC offer the convenience of using only an off-the-shelf hash function with built-in IV. However, one can argue that for the outer compression function -which maps only from {0, 1} c × {0, 1} c rather than from the much larger set {0, 1} c × {0, 1} b -it might be more efficient to use a specially choseñ f . One can even argue that the inner compression function f needs to have better security thanf because it is iterated. That is why Theorem 1 has a 2n tightness gap with respect to the advantage bound ǫ 1 of an f -adversary but not with respect to the advantage bound ǫ 2 of anf -adversary. If one believes that security proofs should guide protocol design and that efficiency should not be sacrificed for security unless a provable security theorem gives grounds for doing so (in [9] Katz and Lindell argue forcefully for this viewpoint), then it is natural to conclude thatf should be less secure than f . Elsewhere (see [13] ) we have raised doubts about this way of thinking, so our personal preference would be not to use a weakerf . But to someone who needs only short-term security this might be an acceptable risk in order to gain a slight edge in efficiency.
7. Conclusions 7.1. The importance of the "right" definitions. In their highly-regarded textbook [9] on the foundations of cryptography, Katz and Lindell write that the "formulation of exact o definitions" is Principle 1 in their list of "basic principles of modern cryptography" and that getting the definitions right is the "essential prerequisite for the...study of any cryptographic primitive or protocol." We agree with this statement, and in [13] we analyzed some of the difficulties and challenges that researchers in both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography have faced in trying to search for a consensus on what the "right" definitions are.
In our study of 1-key nested MACs, we have encountered two instances where the standard accepted definitions are not, in our opinion, the natural and useful ones. First, as we explained in §9 of [14] , in the context of iterated hash functions the usual definition of pseudorandomness needs to be replaced by a stronger definition in which the adversary 8 In the prf-test for f the adversary gets the values f (K, M ) (with K a c-bit hidden key and M a b-bit queried message); in the test forf in HMAC he gets the values f (K, M p) (with M a c-bit message and p a fixed (b − c)-bit padding); and in the test forf in Envelope MAC he gets the values f (M, K p). Thus, the only difference is whether the key occurs in the first c bits or in the next c bits.
is given the power to "reset" the oracle. In the second place, when analyzing the step from NMAC to 1-key versions such as HMAC and Envelope MAC, we believe that our definition of resistance to related-key attack is preferable to the one used by earlier authors.
We have given arguments justifying our use of these new definitions. Nevertheless, it would be arrogant in the extreme for us to claim that we have resolved the question or that our viewpoint is definitive. Cryptography is as much an art as a science, and to some extent decisions about which are the "right" definitions are matters of personal taste.
7.2. The role of mathematical proofs. The NIST documents concerning the SHA-3 competition illustrate the limited role that provable security plays in evaluating realworld cryptosystems. The report [17] that explains the rationale for the selection of the winner devotes about 5% of the section on security to security proofs. The report highlights the role of proofs in showing a hash function's "security against generic attacks -attacks that only exploit the domain extender and not the internals of the underlying building blocks" (p. 11). It notes that all five finalists have this sort of security proof. In other words, the security proofs are useful as a minimal type of assurance that basically says that concrete cryptanalysis should focus on the underlying building blocks rather than on the extension procedure. But the final decision about what to use must be based on extensive testing and concrete cryptanalysis. NIST makes it clear that provable security, although a necessary component in the security analysis, played no part in ranking the five finalists.
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In choosing a MAC scheme, provable security (which, as we argued in [11] , is a misnomer) should play no greater role than it did in choosing SHA-3. All methods of the form in Theorem 1 for constructing MACs from compression functions are good domain extenders if they satisfy the hypothesis of that theorem -of course, "good" only in the limited sense guaranteed by the conclusion of the theorem. As in the case of the SHA-3 competition, the final choice has to be made through ad hoc testing rather than mathematical theorems. In particular, the relative merits of HMAC and Envelope MAC cannot be determined from provable security considerations. The choice between the two (or a decision to go with a totally differentf , g 1 , g 2 ) is a judgment call.
